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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO

DEBORAH COONEY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO; THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; JOHN KERR; IVAN BAROYA; DOMINICK ADDARIO; THOMAS J. MASSEY; TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE; JUDITH MCCONNELL; PATRICIA D. BENKE; JUDITH L. HALLER; JOAN IRION; ALEX C. MCDONALD; JAMES A. MCINTYRE; GILBERT NARES; CYNTHIA AARON; RICHARD D. HUFFMAN; TERRY B. O'ROURKE; YURI HOFMANN; ROBERT C. TRENTACOSTA; BONNY HSU; KEITH PHILLIPS; GEORGE W. BREWSTER, JR.; WILLIAM P. FLYNN; CHRISTOPHER J. SKORINA; JAN I. GOLDSMITH; JOHN RILEY; THOMAS MONTGOMERY; CHRISTINA VILASECA; MATHEW SOUTHER; NEIL, DYMOTT, FRANK, MCFALL & TREXLER; MICHAEL PICKER, PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (CPUC); MICHAEL R. PEEVEY; KAMALA D. HARRIS; XAVIER BECERRA, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL; SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC (SDG&E); ITRON, INC.; EDMUND G. BROWN, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR; RICK SCOTT, FLORIDA GOVERNOR; THE CITY OF WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS; CITY OF VERO BEACH; INDIAN RIVER COUNTY; FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT (FPL); MONPOWER; AT&T CORP.; LEWIS, BRISBOIS, BISGAARD & SMITH, LLP; VOCELLE & BERG, LLP; DEAN,

AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

RINGERS, MORGAN & LAWTON, P.A.; DIAMOND LITTY; KIERNAN MOYLAN; DOROTHY NAUMANN; LYDIA PITTAWAY; BRUCE H. COLTON; BRIAN WORKMAN; DAVID DODD; ELISE BRAWNER; JEFFREY R. SMITH, CLERK OF COURT; MICHAEL RODDY, COURT EXECUTIVE OFFICER; HENRY COKER; RANDY MIZE; BONNIE DUMANIS; SUMMER STEPHAN, SAN DIEGO DISTRICT ATTORNEY; STAN IDEKER; FARMERS INSURANCE; STEWART TITLE INSURANCE; AMERICAN STRATEGIC INSURANCE (ASI); NEW HAMPSHIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; SEACOAST BANK; WHOLE FOODS; WALMART, INC.; CUMBERLAND FARMS; KEITH H. RUTMAN; BRYAN W. PEASE; NICHOLAS J. LEWIS; JOHN SERRANO; STEPHEN I. OSTROW; TENANTS LEGAL CENTER; RICHARD M. BENRUBI; ROONEY & ROONEY, P.A.; EARL K. MALLORY; ANDREW B. METCALF; THOMAS A. KENNEDY; KEVIN M. ROLLIN; WILLIAM TERRY; JUSTIN CLARK; CITY OF SEBASTIAN; TOWN OF INDIAN RIVER SHORES; SOUTH FLORIDA EVALUATION AND TREATMENT CENTER (SFETC); MIKE CARROLL, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (DCF); CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC.; CORE CIVIC, INC.
AND DOES 1-100, INCLUSIVE;

Defendants.

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), Rule 15(a)(1), and this Court's Order Granting Extension of Time to Serve dated July 17, 2018, "Plaintiff", Deborah Cooney, in propria persona, hereby amends the "Verified Complaint" filed March 22, 2018.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985-6 and 18 U.S.C. §1964(a) and (c), Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages for the criminal conduct of the Defendants. Many of the Defendants were parties in previous actions (Underlying Cases) in

which they committed intrinsic and extrinsic fraud on the courts. The remaining Defendants assisted in committing the fraud on the courts, although they had not been named as parties to the original actions. All of the Underlying Cases were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and other legal theories. This action incorporates the violation of federal rights which resulted in fraud on the court, as well as the transgressions enumerated in the Underlying Cases.

2. "The requisite fraud on the court occurs where "it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." *Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp*., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989).

II. JURISDICTION

3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 because Plaintiff's claims arise under the laws of the United States.

4. This Court has original jurisdiction over the civil rights claims in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343(a) and over the racketeering claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1964(c).

5. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).

6. The declaratory and injunctive relief requested is authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202 and by 18 U.S.C. §1964(a).

III. VENUE

7. Venue is appropriate in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(1) because several of the Defendants reside in Northern California.

8. Venue is appropriate in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Northern California. Two of the four Underlying Cases were filed in this Court.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Fraud on the Court

9. The Plaintiff filed four federal 42 U.S.C. §1983 actions and followed all procedural guidelines set forth by law in all four of the Underlying Cases styled Cooney v. San Diego, et al, 3:2013cv00677 and 3:2013cv01373; Cooney v. CPUC et al, 4:2012cv06466; Cooney v. White Sulphur Springs et al, 5:2013cv10377; and Cooney v. Vero Beach et al, 2:2015cv14284.

10. Defendants committed intrinsic and/or extrinsic fraud on the court in all of the Underlying Cases and other related state and federal court cases.

11. Plaintiff was legally entitled to the relief that she sought in all four of the Underlying Cases and all of the other cases that she has filed in various courts of law. In fact, Plaintiff would never file an action in which she was not entitled to relief. Plaintiff is an ethical person.

12. In Cooney v. San Diego, Plaintiff had a right to a jury trial to decide the facts of an underlying case in state court. Justices of the California Court of Appeals made up their own set of facts, which differed from the facts submitted by the parties. Judges are prohibited from acting as lawyers by arguing and asserting facts. Furthermore, appellate courts have no jurisdiction to decide facts. Therefore, the state court judgment is void on its face for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff sought a declaration to this effect in federal court. The federal claim also cited fraud on the state court and chilling of First Amendment rights. Judge Cynthia Bashant, who has ties to the Defendants, improperly dismissed the claim. The dismissal was ostensibly

based upon false information submitted by the Defendants' lawyers. The case was headed for Court of Appeals, where it stood an excellent chance of achieving justice. At the time, Alex Kozinski was Chief Judge, and he was an opponent of police and prosecutorial misconduct. The Defendants doubled down to ensure that the case could not proceed, tampering with Plaintiff's mail, housing, personal relationships, access to telephone and computer. Judge Kozinski later resigned amidst a flurry of overblown and politically motivated accusations of sexual harassment. Thus, the Defendants perpetrated both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud on the court.

13. In Cooney v. CPUC, Plaintiff asserted a constitutional right to be free from harmful radio emissions in her own home. The U.S. District Court ridiculously decreed that it had no jurisdiction over constitutional claims, then proceeded to exercise jurisdiction by dismissing with prejudice. Therefore, the judgment is void on its face. The Court of Appeals declined to rule on the merits, because of Plaintiff's poverty. It is clear that all three judges, District Judge Claudia Wilken and the two Appellate Judges, Barry Silverman and Richard Clifton, had been compromised. All three judges proceeded to senior status shortly after selling out the public health in order to deliver a hollow victory to their pension funds (which hold telecommunication and wireless industry stocks). The case proceeded to Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. Clerk Scott S. Harris fumbled the filings. Defendants interfered with Plaintiff's housing and mail, preventing her from refiling. Thus, Defendants perpetrated both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud on the court.

14. In Cooney v. White Sulphur Springs, Plaintiff was falsely arrested for making a U-turn, after she had signed a notice to appear and made the required appearance. The WV state court correctly found that the U-turn was perfectly legal. The bogus citation was dismissed. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim because she had been arrested without probable cause. The false arrest caused Plaintiff to lose her work contract with The Greenbrier, the largest employer in White Sulphur Springs, WV. Judge Irene Berger waited several years before ruling on the

Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (IFP). Judge Berger, who has ties to Defendant Jim Justice, owner of the Greenbrier, improperly dismissed the claim based upon the Magistrate's recommendation. The Magistrate misstated the facts. The Defendants orchestrated a false arrest and malicious prosecution which prevented Plaintiff from responding. Thus, the Defendants committed extrinsic fraud on the court.

15. In Cooney v. Vero Beach, Plaintiff was falsely arrested while exercising her constitutional right to visit the public library. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that "presence in the library was unquestionably lawful. It was a public facility, open to the public." *Brown v. Louisiana*, 383 U.S. 131, 139 (1966). This false arrest, itself, was extrinsic fraud on the court. It was the Defendants' aborted first attempt to prevent Plaintiff from presenting her 42 U.S.C. §1983 claims in the other three cases. The Defendants schemed to keep Plaintiff falsely imprisoned and committed to a mental institution, although they were well aware that the Plaintiff had never committed a crime, nor had she ever been mentally disordered. Their effort failed because Plaintiff returned to her San Diego home after filing a motion to dismiss and a waiver of appearance. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 action to address the false arrest and malicious prosecution. The federal claim was improperly dismissed by Judge Robin Rosenberg, who has ties to the Defendants and their police unions through her husband, Michael McAuliffe, the former Palm Beach State Attorney. The Defendants filed specious motions to dismiss and prevented the Plaintiff from responding by orchestrating another false arrest, this time for a felony. Thus, the Defendants committed both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud on the court.

16. Many of the Defendants are or were public entities, public employees, public contractors, or officers of the court. Some of the Defendants hold or held state licenses to practice their professions. The remaining Defendants aided and abetted the state actors in perpetrating fraud on the courts.

B. Curtailment of Free Speech

17. Plaintiff exercised her First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. She filed various legal actions in state and federal courts. She filed administrative complaints. She contacted supervisors and public attorneys to informally address the misconduct of their underlings and clients. She went through proper channels and procedures to resolve the issues.

18. Defendants responded by retaliating against her. All of the Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of work, health, housing, mail delivery, legal representation, police protection, justice, transportation, communication, access to telephone and computer, libraries, food, gasoline, water, electricity, and other goods and services. Defendants retaliated by subjecting Plaintiff to illegal stop and frisk detentions, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, battery, radiation injury, and forcible drugging. Defendants committed crimes against Plaintiff such as trespass, theft, burglary, vandalism, extortion, racketeering, and mail fraud. Defendants defamed and slandered Plaintiff, lying about her health, words, and actions. Defendants gaslighted Plaintiff's friends, family, and associates. Defendants abused legal process to destroy Plaintiff's professional and personal reputation. Defendants engaged in a prolonged, organized, and systematic abridgment of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights, as well as other federal rights, including those enumerated in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the right to privacy, and freedom of association.

C. Applicable Statutes

19. Plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Civil action for deprivation of civil rights), §1985 (Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), §1986 (Action for neglect to prevent), and 18 U.S.C. §1964(a) and (c) (RICO Act civil remedies). The Defendants conduct was not only tortious; it was criminal conduct proscribed by 18 U.S.C. §201 (bribery), §§241-2 (deprivation of civil rights), §1341 (mail fraud), §1343 (wire fraud), §1346 (honest services

fraud), §1347 (health care fraud), § 1349 (attempt and conspiracy), §§1702-3, 1705, and 1708 (tampering with mail), §§1961-2 (RICO Act),

20. This case raises significant issues of federal law including 18 U.S.C. §3182 (extradition), 15 U.S.C. §1267(a), 42 U.S.C. §9607 (pollution), the U.S. Constitution, Amendments I, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and IVX, Right to free exercise of religion and freedom of speech, Right to petition the government for redress of grievances, Right of the people to be secure in persons and houses, Right to life, liberty, and property, Right to due process of law, Right to counsel, Right to a speedy trial, Right to a civil jury trial, Right to be free from excessive restraint or punishment, Rights retained by the people, Right to privacy, States shall not deprive citizens of privileges, life, liberty or property, due process of law, and/or equal protection of the laws.

21. The following sections of the California Government Code establish liability to the Plaintiff:
815.2(a) A public entity is vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee.
815.6 A public entity is liable for its failure to discharge a mandatory duty to protect.
820(a) A public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission.
820.8 Nothing exonerates a public employee from liability for injury caused by his own negligence.
11120 The people retain sovereignty over the State agencies which serve them.

22. The following sections of the California Civil Code further establish the Defendants' liability:
43 Right of protection from bodily restraint or harm.
1708 All persons must abstain from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon the rights of another.
1709 One who willfully deceives another is liable for damages.
1710 Deceit is defined as an untrue assertion, suppression of a fact so as to mislead, or a false promise.

1714(a) Liability for injury arises from want of ordinary care or skill.

23. The insurance company Defendants are also liable pursuant to California Insurance Code §790.03(h) and/or Florida statute §626.954(i), unfair claim settlement practices.

24. The following Florida statutes apply: §768.28, Waiver of sovereign immunity in tort actions.

25. The following sections of the West Virginia Code establish liability to the Plaintiff: §29-12A-4(c)(2)(4) and (5); §29-12A-5(b) and (c); §29-12A-8.

Parties

26. The Plaintiff names the following Doe Defendants:

Doe 1 - Fraternal Order of Police (FOP)

Doe 2 - Police Benevolent Society

Doe 3 - Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC)

Doe 4 - Florida Police Chiefs Association

Doe 5 - Florida Sheriff's Association

Doe 6 - International Union of Police Associations

Doe 7 - American Association of State Troopers

Doe 8 - United States Deputy Sheriffs' Association

Doe 9 - Police Protective Fund (PPF)

Doe 10 - National Police Defense Foundation

Doe 11 - National Narcotic Officers Associations Coalition (NNOAC)

Doe 12 - Coast to Coast Landscaping

Doe 13 - Coldwell Banker

Doe 14 – Publix

Doe 15 - Global Tel Link

Doe 16 - Burle Industries

Doe 17 - Court Programs of the Treasure Coast (CPTC)

Doe 18 – CTIA

Doe 19 – Frontier Communications Corporation

Doe 20 – Seacoast Bank

Doe 21 – A-1 Bail Bonds

Doe 22 – Jim Justice

Doe 23 – Robert Clark

Doe 24 – Hoskins, Turco, Lloyd & Lloyd

Doe 25 – Brian McMahon

Doe 26 – Tarek Kiem

Doe 27 – Chad Van Horn

Doe 28 – Leo Desmond

Doe 29 – Christopher Jacobs

Doe 30 – Florida Rural Legal Services

Doe 31 – John Powers

Doe 32 – T. Charles Schafer

Doe 33 – Murphy & Walker

Doe 34 – Jason Herman

Doe 35 - First Presbyterian Church

Doe 36 – First Baptist Church

Doe 37 – Protect My Ministry

Doe 38 – Darden Restaurants, Inc.

Doe 39 – Carnival Cruise Line

Doe 40 – Consulate Health Care of Vero Beach

Doe 41 – Grace Rehabilitation Center of Vero Beach

Doe 42 – First Church of Christ Scientist

Doe 43 – The Lynmoore at Lawnwood Assisted Living and Memory Care

Doe 44 - Martinelli & Associates

Doe 45 – National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO)

Doe 46 – Jorge Cortina del Valle

V.STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Aiding, Abetting, and Conspiracy

27. All of the Defendants participated in all of the wrongdoing and crimes stated herein. Each Defendant's role is more specifically stated below for clarity. However, every Defendant is responsible for every wrong stated herein because all of the Defendants worked together to defraud the courts, to injure and harm the Plaintiff, and to abridge her rights. On March 19, 2018, Plaintiff wrote a letter to the FBI stating the facts regarding the transgressions. This letter was included in the original Verified Complaint filed with this Court on March 22, 2018. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the FBI letter and all documents filed in this case and in the Underlying Cases.

B. San Diego Defendants

28. Defendants City of San Diego, County of San Diego, John Kerr, Ivan Baroya, Dominick Addario, Thomas Massey, Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Judith McConnell, Patricia Benke, Judith Haller, Joan Irion, Alex McDonald, James McIntyre, Gilbert Nares, Cynthia Aaron, Richard Huffman, Terry O'Rourke, Yuri Hofmann, Robert Trentacosta, Bonny Hsu, Keith Phillips, and George Brewster, had been named as Defendants in the Underlying Case, Cooney v. San Diego. Defendants Whole Foods, William Flynn and Christopher Skorina had not yet been named as Doe Defendants. Jan Goldsmith, John Riley, Thomas Montgomery, Christina Vilaseca, Matthew Souther, and Neil, Dymott, Frank, McFall, & Trexler, were attorneys representing the Defendants. All of these Defendants will be referred to collectively herein as the "San Diego Defendants".

29. At all relevant times, the San Diego Defendants committed intrinsic fraud on the federal and state courts by lying about matters of fact and law in their pleadings and motions. They misled the courts on various issues including, but not limited to, whether the Plaintiff was mentally ill, whether they had proceeded in accordance with law, whether due process had been observed, and other matters. They misstated the complaint as well as the law. Defendants Baroya, Addario, Kerr, and Massey maintained that the Plaintiff was mentally disordered, when they knew that this was untrue. The Attorney Defendants breached professional ethics by misleading the courts. The Defendant California Judges had knowledge of these transgressions, yet neglected their duty to report them. On or about October 2016, Defendant Haller denied Plaintiff habeas corpus without jurisdiction to do so. Plaintiff never filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Court of Appeals. Moreover, Haller harbors a bias against the Plaintiff due to the Underlying Case. Haller neglected her duty to recuse herself in light of the conflict of interest. All of the San Diego Defendants proceeded with a devil may care attitude, flagrantly flouting the law, knowing that they had all of the judges in their pocket.

30. At all relevant times, the San Diego Defendants committed extrinsic fraud on the court by unduly influencing the triers of fact, falsely arresting and maliciously prosecuting Plaintiff on July 26, 2016, subjecting her to numerous illegal stop and frisk detentions between July-December 2015 and June-July 2016, tampering with her mail in 2015-7, impeding her access to courts, public buildings, public libraries, and computers, denying her police protection and legal representation, unlawfully taking her San Diego home and all of her possessions. They contributed to the campaigns of Judge Cynthia Bashant, Judge Joel Pressman, City Attorney Jan Goldsmith, District Attorney Bonnie Dumanis, and others in order to throw the cases their way. They, their employees, and/or their affiliates received campaign contributions which created a conflict of interest. They participated with the local drug mafia in killing, drugging, and injuring Plaintiff's common law husband, John Tallent, who died on July 3, 2015. They defamed and

slandered the Plaintiff, writing false official reports, gaslighting her family, friends, and associates. On or about July - October 2016, they goaded her parents into writing false statements. On or about November 2015, they prevented Plaintiff from working under her employment contract with California Music Studios.

31. All of the San Diego Defendants participated in this scheme and/or benefitted by it.

32. On August 25, 2015, and September 17, 2015, the San Diego Public Library sent letters to the Plaintiff threatening to falsely arrest her, and accusing her of viewing pornography and harassing patrons. Plaintiff has never viewed pornography in any public library, nor has she ever harassed anyone. Plaintiff has quietly or silently asked other patrons or staff to observe the rules and laws prohibiting smoking and cell phones. In doing so, Plaintiff was exercising her First Amendment right. On or about August 2017, a postal worker witnessed the library staff harassing the Plaintiff. The postal worker was aghast at the misconduct and offering to be a witness, provided contact information. This information was stolen.

33. Defendant Michael Roddy, Court Executive Officer of the San Diego court, neglected or refused to perform his ministerial duty to issue a clerk's judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action against the trespassers in her home. The trespassers had defaulted, and Plaintiff was entitled to a default judgment. Roddy worked in tandem with the other Defendants to deny Plaintiff due process and equal protection, as well as her right to property.

34. Defendants Henry Coker and Randy Mize were San Diego public Defenders who neglected or refused to defend Plaintiff in the extradition case. They violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Defendants Bonnie Dumanis and Summer Stephan were District Attorneys who maliciously prosecuted the extradition which was not authorized by law. Defendants Roddy, Coker, Mize, Dumanis, and Stephan can all be included in the San Diego Defendants.

C. Police Union Defendants

35. Defendants Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the Police Benevolent Society, the Peace Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the Florida Police Chiefs Association, the Florida Sheriff's Association, the International Union of Police Associations, the American Association of State Troopers, the United States Deputy Sheriffs' Association, the Police Protective Fund (PPF), the National Police Defense Foundation, the National Narcotic Officers Associations Coalition (NNOAC), herein collectively referred to as the "Police Union Defendants", participated in the crimes against the Plaintiff. In 2009, Defendant Kerr testified under oath that the unions were involved in the case. In 2010, Defendant John Serrano advised Plaintiff that the unions were determining the outcome of her case.

36. The Police Union Defendants served as a nexus between all of the Defendants and law enforcement in various locales, including California, Florida, and West Virginia. The Police Union Defendants helped to coordinate efforts among peace officers, judges, attorneys, elected officials, corporate members, and the underworld of drug cartels and mafias. They funnel money to various judicial and other campaigns to create undue influence and ensure that the courts will find in favor of the offending officers, no matter how egregious their conduct. The Police Union Defendants maintain a blacklist of dissidents, including the Plaintiff, who become their targets for police harassment. The blacklist is informally transferred to and acted upon by the various police agencies. The Police Union Defendants ensure that those who contribute get the best police protection and those who criticize are denied police protection. Everyone else is afforded minimal police protection. They inflict special punishment on those who criticize often, such as the Plaintiff, by sending in the mafia to rough them up. This is a protection racket prohibited by the RICO Act. Plaintiff is a victim of this protection racket and has standing to sue.

37. The Defendant Police Unions act not only as labor unions, but also as trade unions, lobbying for corporate interests and special interests. When individuals, attorneys, drug cartels, or corporations, such as Defendants Coast to Coast, AT&T, Coldwell Banker, Walmart, Cumberland Farms, Publix, Whole Foods, or Defendant Insurance Companies, want to disobey the law, they can do so with impunity by joining or donating to a police union. Membership is not restricted to law enforcement officers. Anyone with money can join.

38. Law enforcement officers do the bidding of the Police Unions, rather than acting in the public interest. If an individual officer refuses to kowtow to the will of the Police Unions, he or she is summarily fired and blacklisted. This is how our law enforcement has been hijacked.

D. Prison Contractor Defendants

39. There are special privileges available for police and prison contractors who join the police unions. Defendants Global Tel Link, Burle Industries, A-1 Bail Bonds, Martinelli, various defense attorneys, SFETC, Core Civic, Correct Care, and Court Programs of the Treasure Coast (CPTC), hereafter referred to as Defendant Prison Contractors, pay dues to the police unions in exchange for lucrative contracts predicated on false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive restraint. Defendant Prison Contractors caused physical injury to the Plaintiff, as well as abridgment of her constitutional rights.

40. On or about 2010, Martinelli defrauded the Plaintiff by failing to disclose that they exclusively represented the interests of police and police unions rather than the public interest. They declined to provide services to the Plaintiff alleging that she was a criminal.

41. On or about October 26, 2015, A-1 misinformed the IRC state court that Plaintiff had executed a contract for a bail bond, when in fact, no such contract had been executed. Plaintiff

posted cash bail. A-1 assisted in falsifying the clerk's notes and unlawfully held Plaintiff's car for several days.

42. On or about October-December 2016 and February-March 2017, in the Indian River County (IRC) jail, Global Tel Link's defective telephone equipment proximately caused headaches, toothaches, and damage to Plaintiff's teeth. On or about October-December 2016 and February-March 2017, in the IRC courthouse, Burle's defective equipment proximately caused radiation injury to the Plaintiff including tissue heating, coughing, wheezing, sinus, throat, and lung congestion. On or about March 24, 2017, CPTC attached a faulty GPS ankle monitor which caused Plaintiff's right foot and ankle to swell up and turn blue.

43. On or about October 2016, Core Civic carried out an extradition of the Plaintiff from San Diego to Vero Beach which was not authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3182. Core Civic's employees improperly shackled Plaintiff's ankles, without socks, pants, or padding, and forced Plaintiff to walk fast. This caused Plaintiff to fall and injure her left knee and elbow. The improper shackling was also the proximate cause of irritation and red marks on Plaintiff's ankles. Core Civic's employees denied Plaintiff access to food, water, meals, dental prophylactics, bathrooms, and showers in violation of federal standards. On some days, Plaintiff was given only a small bottle of water and a few pieces of lettuce. Plaintiff was denied a shower for the entire weeklong extradition. Defendants then falsely claimed that Plaintiff was mentally ill because she had not showered in a week.

44. On or about December 20, 2016-February 2017, SFETC and Correct Care subjected Plaintiff to battery on at least three occasions, forcible taking her blood pressure, forcibly injected Plaintiff with an unknown substance that they claimed was tuberculosis, and forcibly drugged Plaintiff with Risperdal. The Risperdal made Plaintiff extremely ill. They kept Plaintiff in conditions which fall below the standard of care. They returned Plaintiff's laundry soaking wet,

refusing to allow Plaintiff access to the dryer. They placed Plaintiff in a filthy cell with no running water and a backed up toilet. On another occasion, they locked her in a closet-sized room with three dangerous mental patients, unsupervised. One patient urinated on the floor, causing Plaintiff to gag. The same patient threatened to hit the Plaintiff.

45. SFETC enlisted a patient to batter the Plaintiff on at least two occasions, Jan. 3 at 10 pm and Jan 14 at 10 pm. The assailant broke Plaintiff's teeth with blows to the head and broke Plaintiff's right hand when she placed it over her head for protection. Plaintiff reported the beatings to the police and Defendant DCF. SFETC turned the police away and retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting the crimes. Plaintiff was again denied police protection. The assailant was rewarded with early release, extra snacks, and better treatment from the staff. The Plaintiff witnessed this same scenario play out against other people, especially those who, like the Plaintiff, did not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization. She often helped them to report the crimes. She was thwarted and retaliated against. Medication was used to cause aggressive behavior. SFETC, Correct Care, and DCF fostered an environment where all of the patients beat each other. Protection was offered only to those who cooperated with the forcible drugging, the abuse, and the racketeering. Needless to say, this treatment does not meet the standard of care.

46. Plaintiff also suffered radiation injury on numerous occasions from X-ray scanners, metal detectors, Stingrays, Tasers, radar, radios, Wi-Fi, and/or other radiation-emitting devices. The police Defendants often misused these devices to deliberately inflict harm. The Doe manufacturers, distributors, or operators are unidentified at this time.

E. CPUC Defendants

47. Defendants CPUC, Michael Peevey, Kamala Harris, SDG&E, and Itron, had been named as Defendants in the Underlying Case, Cooney v. CPUC. Defendants Michael Picker and Xavier

Becerra had not yet been named as Doe Defendants. Picker succeeded Peevey as CPUC President. Becerra succeeded Harris as Attorney General. Defendant Lewis Brisbois, Harris, and Becerra were attorneys representing the Defendants. All of these Defendants will be referred to collectively herein as the "CPUC Defendants".

48. At all relevant times, the CPUC Defendants committed intrinsic fraud on the court by lying about matters of fact and law in their pleadings and motions. They misled the court on various issues including, but not limited to, whether the U.S. District Court had jurisdiction over constitutional issues, whether the complaint stated constitutional violations, whether due process had been observed in the CPUC proceedings, and other matters. They misstated the complaint as well as the law. The Attorney Defendants breached professional ethics by misleading the courts.

49. At all relevant times, the CPUC Defendants committed extrinsic fraud on the court by unduly influencing the triers of fact and working with the other Defendants, especially the Police Union Defendants, to prevent Plaintiff from presenting her case. They arranged a series of false arrests and malicious prosecutions, numerous illegal stop and frisk detentions, tampering with her mail, impeding her access to courts, public buildings, public libraries, and computers, denying her police protection and legal representation, unlawfully taking her homes and all of her possessions. They contributed to the campaigns of Judge John True, the husband of Judge Claudia Wilken, and others in order to throw the case their way. They participated with the local drug mafia in killing, drugging, and injuring Plaintiff's common law husband, John Tallent, who died on July 3, 2015. He had sustained serious injury to his heart from the Smart Meters, as stated in the Underlying Case. They defamed and slandered the Plaintiff, writing false official reports, gaslighting her family, friends, and associates. On or about July - October 2016, they goaded her parents into writing false statements which mentioned Smart Meters. On or about November 2015, they prevented Plaintiff from working under her employment contract with California Music Studios. On or about August 2013 – December 2014, they quashed Plaintiff's

contract work with Darden Restaurants. On or about September 2017, they convinced Carnival to breach Plaintiff's employment contract.

50. All of the CPUC Defendants participated in this scheme and/or benefitted by it.

F. Wireless Defendants

51. Defendants CTIA, FPL, Monpower, Frontier Communications, and AT&T participated in the extrinsic fraud on the court by polluting Plaintiff's home with unwanted radiation, forcing her out of her home, injuring her and others, restricting her access to telephone, internet, electricity and other services. They also cyberstalked her with their internet trolls, defaming, slandering, misinforming, and gaslighting. The Wireless Defendants wrongdoing presents the same issues of fact and law as the CPUC Defendants.

52. The CTIA has worked for many years to defraud the courts and public officials regarding the harm caused by EMF radiation. They manipulated the science, propagandized, and unduly influenced public officials. Like the tobacco industry, they are merchants of doubt. Through these actions, the CTIA has infringed upon the Plaintiff's right to due process, as well as that of the general public.

53. On or about November 2011, Frontier worked with the Pocahontas County (WV) Sheriff to deny or delay Plaintiff's order for telephone service. Again, Plaintiff was subjected to unlawful detention.

54. On or about July 2012, Monpower activated its Smart Grid in the radio-free zone of Green Bank, WV. Plaintiff was again injured by the radiation from her Smart Meter and forced out of her home.

55. On or about October 2013, FPL activated its Smart Grid, injuring Plaintiff and forcing her out of her home. Plaintiff is injured every day on an ongoing basis from FPL's installation. There is a new injury every day, creating yet a new cause of action against FPL.

56. On or about April 2013, Defendant AT&T performed a faulty installation of telephone service which caused excessive radiation levels in Plaintiff's Sebastian, FL home. The telephone line was erroneously connected to the electric meter. A serviceman was sent out to fix the problem, but instead he made a false police report and tried to have the Plaintiff arrested. At the behest of AT&T, Defendant Sebastian's police officers continued to harass the Plaintiff over several months, performing "wellness checks" and other illegal detentions, noting Sig 20 which is cop slang for mentally ill. This was yet another gaslighting effort to defame the Plaintiff. Plaintiff was denied phone service.

57. On or about October 2013, Defendant AT&T created a wiring fault, connecting the telephone wires to the Smart Meter. in another house in Sebastian. Again, Plaintiff had to disconnect the service. Again, Plaintiff was denied telephone access.

58. On or about September 2015, Defendant AT&T connected the telephone line to the electric meter in Plaintiff's San Diego house, causing the same radiation issue as in Sebastian. Again, Plaintiff had to disconnect the service. Again, Plaintiff was denied telephone service.

G. West Virginia Defendants

59. Defendant WSS was named as a Defendant in the Underlying Case, Cooney v. WSS. The city is virtually owned by Defendant Jim Justice, owner of the Greenbrier, the largest employer in town. Justice also owns every judge and public official. He has used his wealth to create undue influence and to wrongfully terminate the Plaintiff's employment at the Greenbrier. Thus Defendants WSS and Justice perpetrated fraud on the courts.

60. Defendant NRAO, located in Green Bank, WV, is a research facility which is open to the public for tours, town meetings, and educational programs. On or about July 2012, NRAO banned Plaintiff from the facility because of her volunteer work for the public health and her exercise of First Amendment rights. NRAO threatened to falsely arrest Plaintiff for trespass.

H. Indian River County Defendants

61. Defendants Indian River County (IRC) and Vero Beach were named as a Defendants in the Underlying Case, Cooney v. Vero Beach. Defendants Vocelle & Berg and Dean Ringers were attorneys representing the Defendants. Although they had not yet been named as Defendants in the Underlying Case, Defendants Diamond Litty and Kiernan Moylan improperly represented the Plaintiff in the malicious prosecution for criminal trespass. They denied Plaintiff her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Defendant Thomas Kennedy was the private defense attorney that the Plaintiff initially hired. He failed to file a crucial motion to dismiss, to which Plaintiff was entitled. He breached ethics by improperly withdrawing from the case, breaching the contract and attorney-client privilege. Defendants Bruce Colton, David Dodd, and Elise Brawner advanced the malicious prosecution. All of these Defendants will be referred to collectively herein as the "IRC Defendants".

62. At all relevant times, the IRC Defendants committed intrinsic fraud on the court by lying about matters of fact and law in their pleadings and motions. They misled the court on various issues including, but not limited to, whether the Plaintiff had committed trespass, whether Plaintiff was mentally competent, whether Plaintiff had a constitutional right to visit a public library, whether the federal complaint stated constitutional violations, whether the Defendants were immune from prosecution, and other matters. They misstated the complaint as well as the law. The Attorney Defendants breached professional ethics by misleading the courts.

63. At all relevant times, the IRC Defendants committed extrinsic fraud on the court by unduly influencing the triers of fact and working with the other Defendants, especially the Police Union Defendants, to prevent Plaintiff from presenting her case. They arranged a series of false arrests and malicious prosecutions, numerous illegal stop and frisk detentions, tampering with her mail, impeding her access to courts, public buildings, public libraries, and computers, denying her police protection and legal representation, unlawfully taking her homes and all of her possessions. Their elected officials, such as Sheriff, received campaign contributions from members of the Defendant Police Unions, Defendant Attorneys, and Defendant Coast to Coast. They contributed to the campaigns of Judge David Morgan, Judge Cynthia Cox, Judge Robert Pegg, and former State Attorney, Michael McAuliffe, the husband of Judge Robin Rosenberg, and others in order to throw the case their way. They participated with the local drug mafia in killing, drugging, and injuring Plaintiff's common law husband, John Tallent, who died on July 3, 2015. They defamed and slandered the Plaintiff, writing false official reports, gaslighting her family, friends, and associates. On or about July - October 2016, they goaded her parents into writing false statements and obstructing justice. On or about November 2015, they prevented Plaintiff from working under her employment contract with California Music Studios. On or about August 2013 – December 2014, they quashed Plaintiff's contract work with Darden Restaurants. On or about September 2017, they convinced Carnival to breach Plaintiff's employment contract.

64. The IRC Defendants worked with Defendant Coast to Coast Landscaping, which operates an illegal drug cartel. The IRC Sheriff participates in the drug cartel by allowing it to operate outside of the law. The IRC Sheriff refuses to enforce the laws against the drug cartel. The IRC Sheriff harasses everyone who objects to the narcotics trafficking and other criminal activity, such as the Plaintiff. The narcotics ring could not operate without this assistance from the Sheriff. Thus, it is referred to as the Sheriff's drug cartel.

65. On October 21, 2015, Michael Hnatusko and Cynthia Little trespassed into Plaintiff's Florida home. Hnatusko threatened to kill Plaintiff and break her fingers. Hnatusko announced that he and Little were working with Defendant Indian River (IR) County' Sheriff and his well-known drug operation through Defendant Coast to Coast Landscaping. Deputies arrived and confirmed this. The deputies pressured Plaintiff to drop her civil rights lawsuits, especially the San Diego and Vero Beach cases. They repeated the mantra of the San Diego police saying, "How's that working for you?" Plaintiff replied as always, "Fine, but it would work better if the courts were just. Even so, I am stating facts in a public forum, holding wrongdoers accountable, and pursuing justice. These things are valuable and meaningful to me."

66. On October 23, 2015, Hnatusko and Little again trespassed into Plaintiff's home. Hnatusko explained that he was working with the Sheriff to use the Plaintiff's house to traffic narcotics, to put the home into foreclosure, and to have the Plaintiff locked up in a mental institution and drugged. The Plaintiff did not believe him. Nevertheless, it all came to pass. On October 24, 2015, Deputy Scott Sposato arrested the Plaintiff on a felony charge without probable cause, thereby setting the Defendants' plan into motion. Sposato was under the influence of a narcotic substance, proving that he was indeed involved with the Sheriff's drug cartel. Sposato submitted a false report. Without a warrant, Sposato seized the Plaintiff's car and everything in it, ransacked it, and held it for days.

67. On or about October 25, 2015, Judge David Morgan made a finding of probable cause with no evidence and no hearing. He issued an illegal "no contact" order, prohibiting Plaintiff from accessing her own home. This illegal act created a title issue. It also gave cover to the Sheriff's drug cartel as they used Plaintiff's home for narcotics trafficking. It was part of a coordinated effort to prevent Plaintiff from presenting the Underlying Cases in court.

68. Defendants Litty, Dorothy Naumann, and Lydia Pittaway improperly represented Plaintiff in the trumped up felony charge. Defendants Colton and Brian Workman put forth the malicious prosecution. Defendant Jeffrey Smith, Clerk of Court in IRC, falsified the record of the maliciously prosecuted felony case. He posted misleading clerk's notes stating that Plaintiff had "absconded" when she had, in fact, properly appeared and answered the trumped up charge against her. After the charge was dropped and the case closed, he served a false notice of court hearing, giving the appearance that the case was ongoing. These Defendants can be included in the IRC Defendants. They committed the same crimes against the Plaintiff.

69. Defendants City of Sebastian and Town of Indian River Shores participated in the same abuses through their police agencies. They staged numerous stop and frisk detentions and denied police protection to the Plaintiff. Sebastian issued an unlawful trespass warning for Publix. Indian River Shores blocked the highway for no public purpose, but only to impede Plaintiff's movement. These Defendants can also be included in the IRC Defendants.

I. Governor Defendants

70. On or about October 2016, Defendants Edmund Brown, California Governor and Rick Scott, Florida Governor, carried out an extradition which was not authorized by 18 U.S.C. §3182 The unlawful extradition impeded Plaintiff's ability to present the Underlying Cases in court. Thus, the Governor Defendants participated in extrinsic fraud on the court. Governors are not immune from prosecution for willful conduct which is proscribed by law. Governors cannot participate in a protection racket with impunity. No public official has immunity to commit such crimes.

J. Retail Defendants

71. Defendants Seacoast Bank, Walmart, Cumberland Farms, Whole Foods, and Publix, are herein referred to as the Retail Defendants. The Retail Defendants blocked Plaintiff's access to credit, food, gasoline, and other vital goods and services. They also harassed Plaintiff by

initiating illegal stop and frisk detentions, making false police reports, and misusing trespass statutes to exclude a blacklisted whistleblower for personal and political reasons. This was coordinated through the Defendant Police Unions. This harassment impeded Plaintiff's ability to present the Underlying Cases in court. Thus, the Retail Defendants committed extrinsic fraud on the court.

72. On or about March 2009, the manager of Whole Foods in La Jolla, CA, banned Plaintiff from shopping at the store, ostensibly because Plaintiff had reported violations of the local smoke-free ordinances and the manager was a smoker. At this time, Plaintiff was dealing with the sexual harassment issues of the Underlying San Diego Case. The Police Unions were likely involved in this abuse. This was the first attempt to restrict Plaintiff's access to food.

73. On or about January 2013, an employee of Defendant Walmart in Lewisburg, WV, stole the Plaintiff's shoes while she was shopping and trying on new shoes. The employee then made a false police report. The police refused to arrest the employee thief and instead threatened to falsely arrest the Plaintiff.

74. On or about August 2013, Plaintiff was falsely arrested while shopping at Publix in Sebastian. She was detained for 30-40 minutes in the police vehicle and injured from radiation emitted by wireless communications devices or energy weapons. The officer issued a trespass warning, a written threat of false arrest for shopping at that particular Publix store in the future. Plaintiff's access to food was again unlawfully restricted.

75. On or about May 2014, Plaintiff visited Seacoast Bank to inquire about a mortgage. The employees refused to help her and made a false police report. A trespass warning was issued in violation of federal Equal Credit Opportunity laws. Plaintiff's access to credit was being

unlawfully restricted. At the time, the Plaintiff was not aware that Seacoast specializes in banking for law enforcement personnel.

76. On or about September 3, 2017, at 11 pm, Plaintiff was subjected to an illegal stop and frisk detention after buying gasoline at Cumberland Farms. Apparently an employee had made a false call to the police. The police issued a trespass warning which threatened to falsely arrest Plaintiff if she ever shopped there again. This further restricts Plaintiff's access to food and gasoline.

77. On or about February 26, 2018, the manager of Publix prevented Plaintiff from shopping and threatened false arrest. This occurred immediately after the manager met with a Police Union operative named Leroy. Plaintiff had been shopping at Publix almost every day for months.

K. Defendant Attorneys

78. Defendants Keith Rutman, Brian Pease, Nicholas Lewis, John Serrano, and Stephen Ostrow are members of the California Bar who breached ethics in the Underlying San Diego Case. All of these attorneys breached ethics because they had a conflict of interest when they advised, consulted with, or represented the Plaintiff. Rutman, Pease, Serrano, and Ostrow advised Plaintiff that she could not enforce her constitutional rights. Rutman had built a practice by holding himself out as a civil rights lawyer who stands up to police misconduct, but in reality he was working with the Police Unions to quash the claims. Pease stated that Defendant Kerr, who sexually assaulted the Plaintiff, was "one of the good ones." Serrano had worked as a City Attorney and was still beholden to the City. Ostrow tried to gaslight the Plaintiff and advised her to do things that would destroy her case. Lewis appeared at the state court summary judgment hearing and botched Plaintiff's opposition. His only legal argument was "Why couldn't they just have left her alone?" He scattered her papers everywhere. Plaintiff had to take over and present a serious opposition.

79. Defendants John Powers and Charles Schafer are Florida criminal defense attorneys. On or about September 2014, John Powers wrongfully denied Plaintiff representation on the bogus trespass charge. On or about November 2015, Defendant Charles Schafer wrongfully denied Plaintiff representation on the bogus felony charge. Schafer also misadvised Plaintiff about points of law.

80. Defendants Rooney, Mallory, Metcalf, Rollin, Murphy & Walker, Terry, and Jason Clark had a conflict of interest and breached attorney-client privilege. Jonathan Rhodeback of Rooney & Rooney divulged this fact to the Plaintiff during a consultation on or about 2017, stating that someone had paid him to misadvise her. Murphy, a donor to the IRC Sheriff's campaign, referred Plaintiff to Rollin, who misadvised Plaintiff and failed to disclose that he was representing law enforcement and police unions. Terry set up a failed police entrapment of Plaintiff on her way to the consultation. J. Clark stated "They are out to get you", but refused to explain who he believed was out to get the Plaintiff and how they were planning to "get" her. J. Clark also tried to defraud the Plaintiff into paying him and signing a contract which would not provide the necessary services.

81. Defendants Robert Clark, Hoskins Turco, Brian McMahon, Brian Cohen, Tarek Kiem, Chad Van Horn, Leo Desmond, and Christopher Jacobs are bankruptcy attorneys who wrongfully denied Plaintiff legal services because she had been a victim of false arrest. Under U.S.C. Title 11 Plaintiff is required to list all legal claims and potential legal claims, including this 1983 claim. Hoskins, Cohen, Kiem, Van Horn, and Jacobs unlawfully used this claim as the reason for denying her legal representation. McMahon made a flimsy excuse about his schedule, but in fact declined the case based on the 1983 claim. This is in direct contravention of the First Amendment right to petition. Moreover, these attorneys represent many clients with similar claims. These events occurred on or about June – August 2018.

82. On or about August 10, 2018, Defendant Van Horn injured Plaintiff with cigarette smoke as she entered the building and threatened false arrest. Cohen and Jacobs both argued that the IRC Sheriff is a saint, that Plaintiff cannot prove the Sheriff's wrongdoing, and that Plaintiff is "crazy" or "kooky".

83. Defendants R. Clark and Hoskins breached their contracts to represent the Plaintiff in her bankruptcy case. R. Clark defrauded the Plaintiff, inducing her to pay $1,200 for legal services which were not rendered, delayed her case for over six week, injured her with cigarette smoke inside his office, threatened false arrest, gaslighted her family, and breached both the contract and attorney-client privilege. On or about June 2017, R. Clark killed and injured Plaintiff's attorney, Susan Semmel, by forcing her to breathe cigarette smoke in their shared office in contravention to Florida statutes. Semmel died of a stroke.

84. On or about October 2017, Florida Rural Legal Services refused to provide legal services for which Plaintiff qualified. They cited the false arrest and malicious prosecution as the reason for their unlawful denial. Because of the Defendant Clerk's falsification of the record, they believed that the case remained open, although it was closed on April 25, 2017.

85. On or about October 2017, Defendant Richard Benrubi breached a contract to represent Plaintiff in the homeowner's insurance claim after delaying the claim for almost eight weeks. On or about April 2018, Defendant Jason Herman wrongfully denied Plaintiff representation in the insurance claims. Both wrongful denials were based upon Plaintiff's 1983 claims from the false arrest and malicious prosecution.

86. All of the Defendant Attorneys denied Plaintiff legal services based upon a Police Union blacklist which may have been promulgated through the various bar associations. All of the Defendant Attorneys had a conflict of interest and breached attorney-client privilege..

L. Defendant Insurance Companies

87. Defendants Farmers, Stewart, ASI, and New Hampshire Insurance companies wrongfully denied Plaintiff's insurance claims for the damages caused by the other Defendants. In addition to violating state insurance statutes, they participated in the fraud on the courts, impeding Plaintiff's ability to present her case by keeping her poor and in squalid conditions. They worked closely with Defendant police agencies and unions to wrongfully deny the claims. They are herein referred to collectively as the Insurance Defendants.

M. Defendant Employers

88. Defendants Carnival, Darden, Consulate, Lynmoore, Grace Rehab., Protect My Ministry, First Presbyterian Church, First Baptist Church, and First Church of Christ Scientist are the Plaintiff's employers or prospective employers who wrongfully terminated or denied employment. They violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1976 (FCRA) and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA).

89. On or about 2014, Darden wrongfully denied Plaintiff employment. On or about September 2, 2017, Carnival breached its employment contract with the Plaintiff.

90. On or about 2014, Defendant Baptist Church wrongfully denied Plaintiff employment as a music teacher based upon a false report that she trespassed. Plaintiff has never trespassed.

91. On or about 2014-2018, Defendant Christ Science Church denied Plaintiff employment as a pianist and singer, stating that Plaintiff "is in trouble with the Sheriff."

92. On or about June 2018, Defendant Consulate and Grace denied Plaintiff employment as a piano entertainer stating that a background check confirmed that she was a felon. Plaintiff has never committed a crime, nor has she ever been convicted of a crime. Defendant IRC Sheriff maintains a website falsely depicting Plaintiff as a criminal.

93. On or about June 2018, the Lymoore wrongfully denied Plaintiff employment because of the Police Union blacklist. The Lynmoore did not state this reason overtly, but made it clear by their actions.

94. On or about February 2018, Defendant Protect My Ministry provided Defendant Presbyterian Church a written background check falsely stating that Plaintiff is a felon. Presbyterian Church wrongfully denied Plaintiff employment as a music teacher with affiliate Primo Music.

95. Defendants had a duty to verify the false information. Defendants' neglected their duty. Defendants are prohibited from denying employment based upon false arrest because certain populations are more frequently falsely arrested thus creating disparate impact. Single women, whistleblowers, political dissidents, and certain religious followers, such as the Plaintiff, suffer false arrest more frequently than the general population. These groups are protected under civil rights provisions.

N. Landlord Defendants

96. Defendant Stan Ideker rented the San Diego house to the Plaintiff for over 12 years. He violated the terms of the lease by working with the Police Defendants to install the drug mafia in Plaintiff's home, thereby preventing her from using or accessing her own home. He stole the Plaintiff's personal possessions by denying her access to the items in her home. These items included some important court documents. He worked with the Insurance Defendants to

wrongfully deny the claims. He failed to refund monies owed to the Plaintiff from her rent and security deposit.

97. Defendant Coldwell Banker leased Plaintiff a house in Sebastian. They summarily breached the contract, forcing Plaintiff to move out, wrongfully retaining monies paid for rent and security deposit. They worked with the other Defendants, especially the Police Defendants, to deny Plaintiff access to housing, effectively shutting her out of the housing market.

O. Mexican Defendant

98. Defendant Jorge Cortina is a Mexican citizen and land owner who operates a drug cartel on his property in Baja California. Drugs are smuggled across the border into San Diego and the U.S. On or about January 2016, Cortina forcibly drugged and sexually assaulted Plaintiff. On or about May 2016, Cortina's drug cartel worked with agents of the U.S. Police Union drug cartel to kidnap Plaintiff and bring her across the U.S. border, where operatives were poised to falsely arrest and extradite the Plaintiff to Florida.

VI. STATEMENT OF LAW

99. This claim arises from the improper litigation of the Underlying Cases.

100. The improprieties give rise to a Federal due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, and 1986, as the Plaintiff was denied a jury trial in violation of her Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional rights.

101. Whereas most of the Defendants are "state actors", as public entities, public employees, public contractors, or officers of the court, they are liable for their participation in the improprieties under 42 U.S.C. ss. 1983, 1985, or 1986. The remaining Defendants worked with the state actors to deny Plaintiff's federal rights and defraud the courts.

102. This claim, filed on March 22, 2018, falls well within the one-year statute of limitations as the abuses are ongoing. The Florida malicious prosecution was terminated on April 25, 2017, and was the Defendants' primary vehicle with which to perpetrate fraud on the courts. Under federal law, "a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." (Knox v. Davis (9th Cir. 2001) 260 F.3d 1009, 1013.) "The applicable statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought in California under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) is the one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3)." (West Shield Investigations & Security Consultants v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 935, 953.) Although state law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.

103. Plaintiff was falsely arrested on October 24, 2015, and wrongfully held in custody until April 25, 2017. Time for filing is tolled during those 18 months. (Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947)). Under the California Code of Civil Procedure §352.1(a), if the plaintiff is imprisoned, the statute of limitations will be tolled either until the plaintiff is released, or for a period of two years – depending on which comes sooner.

104. Plaintiff has complied with FRCP Rule 20(a)(2)(A) and (B). (A) Plaintiff asserts her right to relief against all Defendants jointly, severally, and with respect to the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences. (B) Questions of law or fact common to all Defendants will arise in this action. All of the Defendants participated in an elaborate scheme to chill Plaintiff's free speech and deprive Plaintiff of other federal rights. All of the Defendants played a role in perpetrating fraud on the court.

A. HISTORY OF THE UNDERLYING CASES

105. Plaintiff has continuously made overtures to settle the Underlying Cases for nothing more than improvements in public safety and pledges to honor the Constitution and other laws of the land.

106. The Defendants, public entities, officers, contractors, and employees, have continuously refused to abide by law. This fact, while shocking in its own right, has resulted in exponentially increased losses to the Plaintiff as well as the community at large.

107. The Plaintiff has filed and will continue to file, as necessary, additional litigation and reports to appropriate authorities regarding the ongoing abuses. All members of the judiciary, are required to do the same per the Code of Conduct for United States Judges cited below:

Canon 3 (B) (5): A judge should take appropriate action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood that a judge's conduct contravened this Code or a lawyer violated applicable rules of professional conduct.

108. The record shows that all of the Attorney Defendants violated the American Bar Association Rules of Professional Conduct governing attorney-client privilege, failure to act competently, termination of employment, fees for legal services, conflicts of interest, false statements of fact or law, presenting an action or defense without probable cause and not warranted by law, and/or suppression of evidence. These Attorney Defendants likewise violated the corresponding state bar rules.

B.ONGOING ABRIDGEMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

109. The Defendants' conduct in the Underlying Cases comprises an elaborate scheme to deprive Plaintiff of her First Amendment rights. Plaintiff exercised her right to petition the government for redress of grievances and her right to freedom of speech. In order to strongly discourage Plaintiff from exercising these rights, the Defendants falsely arrested, maliciously prosecuted, and forcibly committed her to a mental institution, knowing full well that she had never committed a crime, nor was she mentally ill, nor had she ever been mentally ill. Defendants demonstrated their ability to get away with this suppression of First Amendment rights, and as a result, chilling these rights ad infinitum.

110. The derailing of the Underlying Cases proves that Plaintiff's First Amendment rights have been effectively and permanently eradicated by the Defendants' conduct. Because Plaintiff is suffering an ongoing deprivation of rights, she has standing to sue. Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to reinstate her Constitutional rights.

111. Case law supports federal intervention under these circumstances.

112. "At the same time, however, the Court clearly left room for federal injunctive intervention in a pending state court prosecution in certain exceptional circumstances—where irreparable injury is 'both great and immediate,' 401 U. S., at 46, where the state law is " `flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions,' " 401 U. S., at 53, or where there is a showing of "bad faith, harassment, or . . . other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief." 401 U. S., at 54." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 US 225, 230 - Supreme Court 1972

113. "But the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court's disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US 479, 486 - Supreme Court 1965

C. THE LANTERMAN-PETRIS-SHORT (LPS) ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

114. Although there have been a few constitutional challenges to the LPS Act, many issues have not yet been addressed by the courts. Free exercise of religion, state-sponsored religion, right to counsel, protection from self-incrimination, right to privacy, cruel and unusual punishment and excessiveness are some of the issues which have not yet been settled by the courts. Although the due process rights have been interpreted as constitutional with regard to a gravely disabled person, they have never been reviewed as they relate to a mentally competent, non-dangerous, law-abiding citizen. The Plaintiff has standing to ask that the Court address these issues here.

115. The facts of the instant case demonstrate that, in practice, the LPS Act is being used to chill freedom of speech. The overbroad sweep of the statute, as well as its deputizing of mental health professionals, creates a rife opportunity for abuse. The abuse it fosters or invites abridges fundamental rights.

116. "When the statutes also have an overbroad sweep, as is here alleged, the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights may be critical. For in such cases, the statutes lend themselves too readily to denial of those rights. The assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded in such cases." See Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, at 379. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US 479 - Supreme Court 1965

117. 16 Am Jur 2d, Sec 177 late 2d, Sec 256:

"The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be In agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail. This is succinctly stated as follows:

The General rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law is in reality no law, but is wholly void and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted. Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it.....

A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it is superseded thereby.

No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it."

118. The U.S. Constitution is the highest statutory authority in the country. All other statutes follow from and are subordinate to the Constitution. Any statute which violates the Constitution must therefore be repealed or modified.

119. The LPS Act is unconstitutional because it imposes a state-sponsored religion, namely a belief in of Western medicine, on the citizens thereby depriving them of their First Amendment right to religious freedom. Many religions eschew Western medicine because it requires the use of harmful, toxic drugs and body-altering surgeries. Moreover, Western doctors, hospitals, and manufacturers of drugs and medical equipment have a strong profit motive to create and diagnose illness in perfectly healthy individuals. These morally reprehensible qualities violate the core beliefs of many religions, including Plaintiff's.

120. There are many natural therapies available to persons who are truly ill, which comply with religious doctrines of Christian Science and Do No Harm" and effectively cure disease and heal injury. The state has no right to impose controversial medical treatment, which many religions prohibit, when natural therapies, accepted by all religions, are widely available and affordable. The state has no right to prevent persons from utilizing safe natural therapies such as nutritional healing, earthing, acupuncture, chiropractic, reflexology, yoga and exercise, etc. to treat disease. Incarceration of the patient effectively prevents access to these safer treatment options.

121. The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the ACLU that the use of a hallucinogenic plant as part of a spiritual practice is protected under the First Amendment religious liberty clause. (*Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Unaio Do Vegetal* (2006) 546 U.S. 418.) Under the same legal theory, the conscientious use of any form of natural healing is similarly protected, and the state-enforced use of chemical, electrical, or surgical treatments, prohibited by certain religious doctrines, would also be unconstitutional. This legal theory is confirmed by several U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Compelling Jehovah's Witness children to salute the American flag against their religious beliefs was held unconstitutional. (*West Virginia v. Barnett* (1943) 319 U.S. 624.) Alabama's "moment of silence" law which required public school children to take a moment for "meditation or voluntary prayer," violated the Establishment Clause. (*Wallace v. Jafree* (1985) 472 U.S. 38.) Conscientious objector status was extended to those who do not believe in a supreme being, but who oppose war based on sincere beliefs that are equivalent to religious objections. (*U.S. v. Seeger* (1965) 380 U.S. 163.)

122. The LPS Act is unconstitutional because it infringes on the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. In common practice, the LPS Act closely resembles a "witch hunt" whereby an individual is singled out, accused of being intoxicated or mentally disordered, and institutionalized without any underlying evidence of unlawful behavior. In *Safford Unified School District v. Redding* (2009) 557 U.S.__ (Docket No. 08-479), the Supreme Court ruled that a 13-year old girl could not be strip-searched based on a classmate's uncorroborated accusation. The Court further defined "probable cause", a far stricter standard than the mere "reasonable suspicion" or the even laxer "reliable knowledge", to require that law enforcement must have knowledge that raises a "substantial chance" of

discovering evidence of criminal activity. The LPS Act does not meet this standard since it incarcerates and invasively searches without requiring any suspicion of criminal conduct. The on-demand urine drug test authorized by the LPS Act contravenes the central holding of *Chandler v. Miller* (1997) 520 U.S. 305, which struck down a Georgia law requiring candidates for political office to take a drug urine test.

123. The LPS Act abridges the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, under the guise of a psychological examination. The renown *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436, established Miranda warnings to advise arrestees of these rights. *Escobedo v. Illinois* (1964) 378 U.S. 478, prohibited unconstitutional interrogations, such as an "evaluation" under the LPS Act.

124. The LPS Act is unconstitutional because it violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements of "due process of law." The practice of seizing persons without a warrant, when it is clear that no laws have been broken, imprisoning them without bail, Miranda rights, or a speedy trial is in direct contravention of both the U.S. and the California Constitution. Due process has been interpreted to mean that "...before a man's life or liberty or property may be taken by the state, he must be given notice of the proceedings which may terminate in the taking, and be given an opportunity to be heard in his own defense." *(Beck v. Ransome-Crummey* (1919) 42 Cal. App. 674, 184 P. 431, 433.) The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in *Addington v. Texas* (1979) 441 U.S. 418, raised the standard of proof for involuntary commitment to "clear and convincing evidence." (CT 2:403-4) The much lower standard of "probable cause" allowed by the LPS Act is therefore unconstitutional.

125. The judicial interpretation of liberty guaranteed by the due process clause was further expanded in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (1965) 381 U.S. 479 to "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." The Supreme Court used this rationale to strike down a state law which meddled into private matters of health care. The Fourteenth Amendment reads: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens...nor deny any person the equal protection of the laws." The LPS Act severely curtails the privileges and immunities of mentally disordered persons and denies them equality.

126. The LPS Act is unconstitutional because it imposes "cruel and unusual punishment" in direct contravention of the Eighth Amendment. In a civilized society, it is considered highly improper to throw a sensitive woman, who has broken no laws, into an open area of a mental institution to co-mingle with criminally insane and otherwise dangerous persons, primarily of the male gender. Common decency dictates that sick persons who can care for themselves competently at home or on their own should not be forcibly subjected to inferior and inhumane care by the state, especially when such persons have never committed a crime. Responsible medicine does not authorize the medical treatment of a condition, when the condition does not exist or has not been diagnosed or verified, yet such treatment is being forcibly rendered under the LPS Act. Furthermore, it is counter-productive to punish persons at all when they have not violated any penal code.

127. This argument is further supported by Constitutional case law. A punishment is "excessive," and therefore prohibited by the Amendment, if it is not graduated and proportioned to the offense. (*Weems* v. *United States* (1910**) 217 U.S. 349,367.)** The LPS Act imposes punishment, masquerading as "treatment", even in instances where there is no offense. By the *Weems* standards, no punishment should result when no offense has been committed. Even the *Weems* dissenting opinion concurs with Appellant's analysis, "the clause against cruel punishments, which was intended to prohibit inhumane and barbarous bodily punishments" such as the treatment imposed by the LPS Act, including forcible drugging, injection, electric shock or surgery.

128. An excessiveness claim is judged by currently prevailing standards of decency. *(Trop* v. *Dulles* (1958) 356 U.S. 86.) The *Trop* opinion goes on to state that the Eighth Amendment bars "the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society." Involuntary hospitalization certainly fits this bill, preventing people from pursuing their profession, contributing to society, and fulfilling familial duties at home. In *Rochin v. California* (1949) 342 U.S. 165, the Supreme Court abolished acts which "shock the conscience" or violate the "decencies of civilized conduct."

129. The LPS Act is unconstitutional because it infringes on the "right to privacy", a long-acknowledged fundamental human right, covered under the penumbra of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Ninth Amendments, and further defined by case law such as *Roe v. Wade* (1973) 410 U.S. 113, P. 147-164, which protects the right of a woman and her doctor to make health care decisions regarding abortion, prohibiting state intervention. Similarly, *Gonzales v. Oregon*

(2006) 546 U.S. 243 held that terminally ill persons have a right to make end-of-life decisions in consultation with their doctors, rejecting the federal government's misguided effort to interfere. The power to make intimate personal decisions pertaining to health care rests exclusively with the individual and his or her chosen health practitioner, and is not the province of an overbearing state.

D. THE FORENSIC CLIENT SERVICES (FCS) ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

130. Florida statute chapter 916 et seq., known as the Forensic Client Services Act, is unconstitutional for the same reasons stated above regarding the LPS Act. The FCS Act further deprives persons of their rights to counsel and speedy trial afforded by the Sixth Amendment.

E. DEFENDANTS VIOLATED THE LPS ACT AND/OR THE FCS ACT

131. Even if the LPS and FCS Acts were compatible with the Constitution, Defendants are still liable for violating them. Neither the LPS Act nor the FCS Act authorizes the involuntary commitment or treatment of a non-dangerous, mentally competent law-abiding person, nor do they authorize any court to sanction such an involuntary commitment.

F. DEFENDANTS VIOLATED PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS

132. The Defendants have abridged the Plaintiffs civil rights under the United States Constitution as follows:

<u>First Amendment right to free exercise of religion</u>

133. Plaintiff's practices the Christian Science faith. Plaintiff's religion espouses the doctrine of "do no harm" and eschews Western medicine, as it has been proven very harmful to humans. Plaintiff believes in living in harmony with nature and keeping the body well-nourished, well-rested, and free of toxins. Defendants have infringed upon her right to practice this religious

belief. Defendants have also instituted a state-sponsored religion, the cult of Western medicine, in violation of the First Amendment.

First Amendment right to freedom of speech and right to petition the government for redress of grievances

134. Defendants have refused to honor Plaintiff's right to request public health and safety provisions by bringing a legal action in a court of law as well as other means. In fact, they have gone to extreme measures to silence the Plaintiff. Defendants have taken harsh and unlawful measures to retaliate against Plaintiff's honest reporting of their misconduct.

Fourth Amendment right of the people to be secure in their persons

135. Arrest without probable cause is strictly prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Defendants have not only violated Plaintiff's person, but have repeatedly improperly justified their transgressions.

Fifth Amendment right to life, liberty, and property

136. Defendants have proximately and systematically caused Plaintiff to lose her liberty, by enforcing, upholding, or misapplying California, Florida, and West Virginia laws in violation the Constitution. Defendants have proximately caused Plaintiff to lose her property and reduce her business earnings and her savings.

Fifth Amendment right to due process of law

137. Defendants have denied Plaintiff the due process of litigating her claims in accordance with publicly-maintained statutory procedures.

Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial and counsel

138. Defendants repeatedly denied the Plaintiff access to competent counsel. Defendants further interfered with Plaintiff's ability to represent herself in court. Defendants held Plaintiff in custody denying her a trial for more than 18 months.

Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial

139. Defendants have gone to drastic extremes to deny Plaintiff a jury trial in the Underlying Cases.

Eight Amendment right to be free from excessive restraint or punishment

140. Defendants have advanced a malicious prosecution which caused Plaintiff to endure excessive restraint as well as torture. Plaintiff has never committed a crime, nor is there any evidence of this. The malicious prosecution did not serve any legitimate state interest.

Ninth and Tenth Amendment rights retained by the people and right to privacy

141. Defendants have conducted and upheld the intrusion of Plaintiff's person and property, in ways that usurp power and disparage rights possessed by the Plaintiff.

142. Fourteenth Amendment: States shall not deprive citizens of privileges, life, liberty or property, due process of law, and equal protection of the laws

143. All of the above applies specifically to all of the Defendants who are authorized to act under color of the law or who aided and abetted the state actors. By ignoring or violating statute, Defendants have denied Plaintiff equal protection of the laws.

144. The infringement of civil rights described above are expressly prohibited by the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. ss. 241-2, Chapter 13, Civil Rights, Conspiracy against rights, Deprivation of rights under color of law. Civil remedies are set forth in the Public Health and Welfare Code, 42

U.S.C. ss. 1983, 1985, and 1986, Chapter 21, Civil Rights, Civil action for deprivation of rights, Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, Action for neglect to prevent.

G. PLAINTIFF HAS TAKEN RESPONSIBILITY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES

145. Plaintiff has lived an exemplary and healthy lifestyle. Plaintiff takes care of her health, eating fresh, nourishing, organic foods, drinking clean water and nothing else (no coffee or soft drinks), getting plenty of exercise and fresh air, going to the beach or natural landscape daily to practice yoga, swim, walk, hike, jog or bicycle. Consequently, Plaintiff has enjoyed excellent health.

146. Plaintiff has never suffered from a mental disorder.

147. Plaintiff is a law-abiding citizen.

148. Plaintiff has never engaged in any dangerous behavior.

149. Plaintiff is a teetotaler. Plaintiff has never used drugs, whether prescription or street drugs.

150. Plaintiff practices her religious belief in natural healing, using only gentle, safe, effective, traditional methods of healing from illness or injury. Plaintiff does not use forceful, harmful allopathic medicine.

H. DEFENDANTS ACTED WITH MALICE, FRAUD, AND OPPRESSION

151. Defendants recklessly and maliciously violated the Plaintiff's rights, knowing or with reasonable diligence they should have known, that they were infringing upon the Plaintiff's liberties and causing her to incur damages.

152. Defendants defrauded the Plaintiff and the general public by falsely asserting as fact statements that they knew, or with reasonable diligence, should have known, were untrue.

153. Defendants' reckless and criminal behavior was oppressive and harmful to the Plaintiff.

I. GROUNDS FOR INJUCTIVE RELIEF

154. There is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of this case.

155. The Plaintiff faces substantial damages if injunction is not granted. Plaintiff's damages consist of an ongoing loss of her Constitutional rights. Moreover, there are hundreds, if not thousands, of other citizens facing similar damages and injuries.

156. The balance of harm to the Plaintiff and the general public weighs in favor of the Plaintiff. The hardship to the Plaintiff and the general public greatly outweighs any costs that Defendants would incur through the issuance of the injunction as requested. In fact, the Defendants should not incur any cost at all from the proposed order and will actually save money, in the long run, by immediately ceasing an unsafe, unlawful and costly practice, thus mitigating damages and injuries to the population at large and reducing the number and dollar amount of claims for civil rights violations or injuries.

157. The granting of the requested injunction would serve the public interest by setting a precedent to protect all citizens from similar abuses.

VII. PLAINTIFF RETAINS ALL RIGHTS

158. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Complaint to correct legal errors or omissions due to her inexperience in legal matters, or to supplement with additional information which is revealed through discovery, or for any other reason.

159. The true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as Does 1-100, inclusive, are unknown to the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff therefore sues these Defendants under fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. These fictitiously named Defendants were involved in and were parties to the furtherance of the acts complained of herein.

160. Plaintiff incorporates all paragraphs and causes of action into all other paragraphs and causes of action herein.

161. Plaintiff incorporates all documents submitted in all of the Underlying Cases into the causes of action stated herein.

162. Plaintiff wishes to exercise the right to a civil jury trial conferred upon her by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

163. Plaintiff appears in this action In Propria Persona or Pro Se, and asks that the issues raised herein be addressed "on the merits", *Sanders v. United States*, 373 US 1, at 16,17 (1963); and addressed with "clarity and particularity", *McClesky v. Zant*, 111 S. Ct. 1454 at 470-71 (1991); and that the Plaintiff be afforded a full and fair evidentiary hearing, *Townsend v. Sain*, 372 US 293 at p.1 (1962) See also *Picking v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co*., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945).

164. Plaintiff asks this Court to recognize the fact that this "Pro Se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than lawyers." *Haines v. Kerner, Warden of Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard,* 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d, 652 (1972). See also *Platsky v. CIA*, 953 F. 2d 26 (1971), "Court errs if Court dismisses pro se litigant without instructions of how pleadings are deficient and how to 'repair' pleadings."

165. "Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end…Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment." *Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co.*, 303 US 197 (1938).

166. "A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[5] Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114. Cf. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183. And see Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13." *Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of NM*, 353 US 232, P. 238-9 (1957).

167. "[T]here [can] be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967)" *Sherar v. Cullen*, 481 F. 2d 945, P. 947 (1973).

VIII. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

168. By this action, the Plaintiff endeavors to safeguard and protect the public health and justice from the abuses of the "government-industrial complex", a variation on a term originally coined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as the "military-industrial complex." In a famous speech on January 17, 1961, President Eisenhower astutely recognized the devastating potential influence of unbridled avarice on our political system. He warned that this would be the greatest threat to our democracy. The same principles apply here vis-a-vis the health care industry, and specifically concerning mental health. The Plaintiff prays that this Court will prudently exercise its authority to reverse this trend before every law-abiding citizen is locked away in the name of corporate profit.

169. The Plaintiff has filed this action with the sincere hope of empowering the weak to stand up and push back against the tyranny of the strong, thus achieving balance and justice. The Plaintiff strives to be a role model, an inspiration, and even a mentor to others who wish to assert their legal rights in the face of unconscionable abuses. Most of the victims cannot afford to hire counsel, and are left with only two unsavory options: knuckle under, thereby enabling the abuse, emboldening the abusers, and encouraging future abuses of even greater magnitude; or make a significant investment of time, energy, and emotional fortitude into the pursuit justice through the legal system, taking the time to study the law, research the issues, painstakingly prepare the documents, and thoughtfully compose the legal arguments. This is the dawning of the "pro per revolution" in which the people take back their power through proper legal channels. Echoing the wisdom of the heroic citizen activist, Ralph Nader, the institutional criminals may habitually tune out the voice of the people, but they understand and take heed when they are served with a civil lawsuit.

IX. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

170. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the compensatory, declaratory and injunctive relief herein sought, as well as costs, and such other and further relief as the Court shall deem proper.

A.COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

First Claim for Relief

171. Plaintiff has suffered losses of life's priceless treasures, which cannot easily be reduced to dollar amounts. Plaintiff's actual damages are astronomical. A conservative estimate of legally cognizable damages is displayed below:

General Damages:

Pain, suffering, and inconvenience……$ 1,000,000

Emotional distress……$ 1,000,000

Estimated future losses from emotional distress…… $ 2,000,000

Loss of consortium…….....$5,000,000

Special Damages:

Loss of earnings (to date)……...$ 1,000,000

Estimated future loss of earnings from emotional distress…..……$2,000,000

Punitive Damages……...$ 8,000,000

Total Damages…….$ 20,000,000

172. If the Court grants the declaratory and injunctive relief as requested below, the Plaintiff's future losses will be significantly diminished, and the Plaintiff will be willing to accept only $16,000,000 in total compensatory damages, based on the restoration of her Constitutional rights.

B.DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Second Claim for Relief

173. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that all of the Defendants have committed or aided and abetted the commissions of both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud the federal courts in the four Underlying Cases and/or the state courts of California, Florida, and/or West Virginia.

Third Claim for Relief

174. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the judgments are void in the four Underlying Cases and the 2009 California sexual harassment case due to fraud on the court.

Fourth Claim for Relief

175 Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that all of the Attorney Defendants have violated the due process and equal protection clauses by breaching professional ethics.

Fifth Claim for Relief

176. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue an injunction preventing Defendant Indian River County from continuing to use the Sheriff's office to traffic in narcotics.

Sixth Claim for Relief

177. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue an injunction preventing Defendant Indian River County from continuing to use the Sheriff's office to burglarize or vandalize privately owned real or personal property.

Seventh Claim for Relief

178. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue an injunction preventing the Defendant City of San Diego from using its police force to burglarize or vandalize privately owned real or personal property.

Eighth Claim for Relief

179. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue an injunction preventing all Defendants with police or prosecutorial powers and all Defendant public attorneys from continuing their practice of illegal stop and frisks, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and false allegations of mental illness, and false reporting of any kind.

Ninth Claim for Relief

180. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue an injunction against the use of all energy weapons, tasers, stingrays, GPS monitors, x-ray scanners, wireless courtroom security installations, and other radiation-emitting devices, based upon their harmfulness to human health and the environment. No state has the constitutional authority to cause such harm.

Tenth Claim for Relief

181. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the Defendant City of San Diego's coerced agreement preventing Plaintiff from visiting La Jolla Cove is void and unconstitutional.

Eleventh Claim for Relief

182. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the Defendants violated Plaintiff's civil rights under the U. S. Constitution, the highest statutory authority, and thus, the Defendants are liable for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ss. 1983, 1985 and/or 1986.

Twelfth Claim for Relief

183. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that Defendants Colton, Workman, Dodd, Brawner, Vero Beach, and Indian River County falsely arrested, imprisoned, and maliciously prosecuted the Plaintiff in a manner contrary to law.

Thirteenth Claim for Relief

184. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue an injunction requiring Defendants Roddy, Smith, Vero Beach, and Indian River County to seal or expunge the judicial and non-judicial arrest records and court records which were brought about contrary to law.

Fourteenth Claim for Relief

185. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the plaintiff has a right to be in any public place that is open to the public.

Fifteenth Claim for Relief

186. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue an injunction requiring Defendants San Diego City and County, Vero Beach, and Indian River County to remove and rescind any trespass warnings and refrain from arresting for trespass any person who is in a public place which is open to the public.

Sixteenth Claim for Relief

187. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that any establishment that is open to the public cannot force a person to leave as retaliation for exercising free speech. The use of any trespass statute for this purpose is unconstitutional as applied.

Seventeenth Claim for Relief

188. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the denial of the Plaintiff's habeas corpus petitions by the state and federal courts was unconstitutional.

Eighteenth Claim for Relief

189. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the LPS Act, also known as California Welfare & Institutions Code section 5000 et sequence, and the FCS Act, also known as Florida Statute Chapter 916 et sequence, are unconstitutional both facially and as applied.

Nineteenth Claim for Relief

190. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the conduct of Defendants SFETC, Correct Care, and DCF fell below the standard of care.

Twentieth Claim for Relief

191. Because of the declared infringement of state and federal law, and in order to promote and protect the public health and safety, and in the interest of significantly reducing monetary damages, Plaintiff prays for a preliminary injunction to immediately suspend the practice of forcibly incarcerating or institutionalizing healthy, law-abiding citizens.

Twenty-First Claim for Relief

192. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that Defendant Peevey has breached ethics and violated the California Public Utilities Code section 303(a) by holding an official relationship to and a financial interest in the companies and/or persons that he is entrusted with regulating. Plaintiff further requests that the Court declare all of the CPUC legal proceedings under the leadership of Defendant Peevey, regarding the Smart Grid, void due to fraud on the CPUC.

Twenty-Second Claim for Relief

193. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the Defendants SDG&E, FPL, and Monpower violated 42 U.S.C. section 3515b and 45 CFR Part 46 by using Federal funds to subject the unsuspecting population to a horrific human experiment on the non-thermal effects of non-ionizing radiation, without obtaining the informed consent of the participants, and/or by subjecting the participants to greater than minimal risk, and/or by imposing risks that are not reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits.

Twenty-Third Claim for Relief

194. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to declare that the Defendants SDG&E, FPL, and Monpower violated 18 U.S.C. ss. 371, 653, 666, 1001, and 1018 by making false and fraudulent statements in their Smart Grid Deployment Plan, by which they received Federal matching funds under 42 U.S.C. section 17386. Plaintiff further prays that the Court remand these Defendants and their officers to the U.S. Attorney General for criminal prosecution under the Title 18 Criminal Code.

Twenty-Fourth Claim for Relief

195. Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court to issue a preliminary injunction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. section 1267(a) prohibiting all Defendants from transporting or receiving, or allowing the transport or receipt of hazardous substances, including Smart Meters and Smart Grid equipment, across state lines. Plaintiff further requests that the Court declare that Defendants Itron, SDG&E, FPL, Monpower, Peevey, and Picket are liable for damages caused by their complicity in the release of hazardous substances, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 9607.

Twenty-Fifth Claim for Relief

196. Because of the declared infringement of state and federal law, and in order to promote and protect the public health and safety, and in the interest of significantly reducing monetary

damages, Plaintiff prays for a preliminary injunction to immediately dismantle and roll back the Smart Grid program, remove all associated radio frequency and digital equipment, and replace with the original, safe, analog equipment which worked flawlessly for many years prior to the Smart Grid installation. If necessary, Plaintiff requests that the Court declare the Smart Grid Act unconstitutional as applied.

197. Plaintiff prays that the preliminary injunction be extended until such time as a safe, reliable, and efficacious Smart Grid can be designed, manufactured, procured, properly tested for health and safety, and implemented; or until the people, through a referendum or through their elected representatives, decide to discard, disband, and dismantle the Smart Grid program upon finding it to be a useless and wasteful diversion from the quest for clean, sustainable energy. Plaintiff prays that the preliminary injunction be permanent.

X. VERIFICATION

I, Deborah Cooney, verify and declare that the factual statements in the foregoing Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: March 22, 2018

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Deborah Cooney, Plaintiff in Propria Persona